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IN THE SUPRE~tr7E COURT 
of the 
STATE OF UTAH 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff and Respondent, 
vs. 
'THEODORE I. GEURTS, ) 
Defendant and Appellant. 
Case No. 
9281 
PETITION FOR REHEARING AND RECONSIDERATION 
COMES NOW the defendant, THEODORE I. GEURTS, 
and moves the court for a rehearing of the above entitled case 
and reconsideration of the court's opinion issued therein on 
February 3, 1961, upon the following grounds: 
1. The court erroneously stated and assumed that defend-
ant's counsel, prior to the trial, had been permitted access to 
the transcript of the testimony of the state's witnesses as given 
before the grand jury. 
2. The court erroneously assumed and stated that the 
trial court's refusal to permit the defendant to take depositions 
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was based upon the fact that the defendant had been otherwise 
furnished full information as to the charges. 
3. The court erroneously assumed and stated that the 
defendant sought depositions of the state's witnesses only for 
the purpose of discovery. 
4. The court erroneously held that the information given 
to the defendant in the answers to interrogatories was sufficient 
to use as a basis for cross-examination of the state's witnesses. 
5. The refusal of the court to grant the defendant the 
right to take the depositions of the state's witnesses, or in the 
alternative a preliminary hearing, deprived the defendant of 
due process of law in violation of Section 7, Article I of the 
Constitution of the State of Utah, and in violation of the 14th 
Amendment of the Constitution of the United States of 
America. 
6. The court erred in holding that there was a common 
law crime known as umalfeasance in office" which Should 
have advised persons of ordinary intelligence of the meaning 
of such term. 
7. The court erred in holding that the three charges in 
the accusation in this case were such charges as could be charged 
in a single indictment and tried in a single trial under the rules 
of criminal procedure of the state of Utah. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
THE COURT ERRONEOUSLY STATED AND AS-
SUMED THAT DEFENDAN'f'S COUNSEL, PRIOR TO 
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THE TRIAL, Hi\D BEEN PERMITTED ACCESS TO THE 
,_fRANSCRIPT OF THE TESTIMONY OF THE STATE'S 
WITNESSES AS GIVEN BEFORE THE GRAND JURY. 
POINT II 
THE COURT ERRONEOUSLY ASSUMED AND STAT-
ED THAT THE TRIAL COURT'S REFUSAL TO PERMIT 
THE DEFENDANT TO TAKE DEPOSITIONS WAS BASED 
UPON THE FACT THAT THE DEFENDANT HAD BEEN 
OTHERWISE FLTRNISHED FULL INFORMATION AS TO 
THE CHARGES. 
POINT III 
THE COURT ERRONEOUSLY ASSUMED AND STAT-
ED THAT THE DEFENDANT SOUGHT DEPOSITIONS 
OF THE STATE'S WITNESSES ONLY FOR THE PUR-
POSE OF DISCOVERY. 
POINT IV 
THE COURT ERRONEOUSLY HELD THAT THE 
INFORMATION GIVEN TO THE DEFENDANT IN THE 
ANSWERS TO INTERROGATORIES WAS SUFFICIENT 
TO USE AS A BASIS FOR CROSS-EXAMINATION OF 
THE STATE'S WITNESSES. 
POINT V 
THE REFUSAL OF THE COURT TO GRANT THE 
DEFENDANT THE RIGHT TO TAKE THE DEPOSITIONS 
OF THE STATE'S WITNESSES, OR IN THE ALTERNA-
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TIVE A PRELIMINARY HEARING, DEPRIVED THE 
DEFENDANT OF DUE PROCESS OF LAW IN VIOLA-
TION OF SECTION 7, ARTICLE I OF THE CONSTITU-
TION OF THE STATE OF UTAH, AND IN VIOLATION 
OF THE 14TH AMENDMENT OF THE CONSTITUTION 
OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA. 
Counsel will argue these points together as they relate 
generally to the same subject matter. 
Both the prevailing and the dissenting optnton assume 
that counsel for defense had access to the transcript of the 
grand jury proceedings. This is not true. Counsel has not seen 
the transcript to this date. 
The decision of this court upholding the right of counsel 
for Commissioner Geurts in the criminal case to see the grand 
jury transcript was issued on September 10, 1959. In October 
Judge Faux issued his ruling on the defense motion to quash. 
Immediately the defendant filed a demand for a bill of par-
ticulars. This demand came on for hearing on November 2, 
1959, and was granted by the court. At that time counsel for 
the defendant informally inquired of Judge Faux as to when 
he would have the grand jury transcript ''screened" so as to 
permit the defendant's counsel to examine the same. Judge 
Faux stated that the work of screening would be quite exten-
sive; that he would not undertake it until it appeared that 
the criminal case was going to trial and that therefore, the 
matter should stand as it was until the bill of particulars 
was furnished. However, he stated, when the criminal case 
approached trial this transcript would be made available to 
the defendant in sufficient time for adequate examination. 
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This appeared then and it now appears to be a logical posi-
tion for Judge Faux to have taken, and the defendant took 
no exception thereto. However, the bill of particulars was 
never furnished and the criminal case never did come any-
where near trial. In fact the facts and circumstances force 
the conclusion that one of the reasons why the criminal case 
was never brought to trial was that the district attorney was 
willing to go to any lengths to prevent the defendant's counsel 
from examining the grand jury transcript. 
If there is any question in the court's mind as to whether 
this transcript has been made available to counsel for the 
defense, it can be dispelled by reading pages 310 and 311 
of the record (Tr. 224 and 225). There District Attorney 
Banks attempted to cross-examine Mr. Geurts from the grand 
jury transcript. Counsel for the defense objected to this pro-
cedure on the grounds that the grand jury transcript had 
never been made available to the defendant for examination. 
The objection was sustained by Judge Van Cott. 
The principal premise, therefore, upon which the court 
bases its conclusion that the refusal to permit the taking of 
depositions was not prejudicial falls, and the court should 
change its position and hold that this error was prejudicial. 
In its opinion the court concludes that Judge Van Cott' s 
denial of the defendant's demand to take the depositions of 
the state, s witnesses was based upon the ground that the 
defendant already had full information in the case. A reading 
of the record shows that this is not so. At page 20 of the 
record is found the state, s motion to suppress the taking of 
depositions. This motion is not upon the ground that the 
defendant already had all information, but upon the ground 
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((that the defendant does not have the right to take deposi-
tions in this action in that this action is civil in nature but 
crtminal in form." This is the basis upon which the motion 
was sought and the basis upon which Judge Van Cott orally 
stated from the bench that he was granting the motion. Fur-
thermore, it is a basis that this court has already held was 
erroneous. 
The court further is not justified in its statement that in 
regard to the taking of depositions the defendant does not 
((argue their value for impeachment or cross-examination." 
It is true that in the brief of the defendant counsel devotes 
this section principally to the question of the use of the 
depositions as a means of eliminating Count I prior to trial. 
This was done principally because this is the point that appeared 
to counsel to be the one which required the most discussion. 
The use of depositions for the purpose of impeachment and 
cross-examination and the disadvantage which comes from 
the lack of such depositions is too clear to anyone who has 
tried a law suit to require that it be labored in a brief. 
Under the points relied upon on appeal, we stated ''The 
court erred in denying the defendant the right to take the 
depositions of witnesses prior to trial, or in the alternative 
to a preliminary hearing." The question of the use of depo-
sitions for impeachment and cross-examination came up and 
was discussed at some length during the oral argument on 
the case. At that time counsel stated that he felt he had been 
prejudiced by the lack of depositions for this purpose. If the 
court will recall, Mr. Justice Wade from the bench asked the 
counsel for the defendant if he had not talked to the witnesses 
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to this question from Justice Wade, counsel for the defendant 
stated that in regard to Count I he had talked to Mr. Reed 
and that Mr. Reed had discussed the matter rather freely, 
and that as to such count, the defendant's counsel felt he 
was under no disadvantage. Counsel further stated, however, 
that the witnesses as to Count II and Count III were far from 
willing to discuss the matter freely and that counsel felt he 
was under a distinct disadvantage as to these two counts. 
Any member of this court who has ever defended a 
criminal case must be well aware of the reluctance of state 
witnesses to talk freely to counsel for the defense prior to 
the time the case comes to trial. 
It is difficult to see how the information given to the 
defendant in the state's answers to interrogatories ( R. 14-17) 
could in any way be utilized for the purpose of cross-exami-
nation of the witnesses. While this document is somewhat 
more voluminous and verbose than the accusation itself, it 
is certainly no more detailed and offers no information that 
can be used in cross-examination. It merely states that three 
men, Gerardus Kip, Helmeth F. Kleist, and Joseph W. Bertram, 
on four occasions between February 1, 1959 and May 31, 1959 
took soil, shrubs and trees to the homes of the defendant and 
his son-in-law. It does not say who took what and in what 
quantities, or on what certain days. It gives no details which 
would permit counsel on cross-examinaton to determine 
whether or not they were city trees and shrubs, as contended 
by the state, or privately owned trees and shrubs, as contended 
by the defendant; or whether the city employees did this work 
on city time, as contended by the state, or on their own time, 
as contended by the defendant. Other than to give a panoramic 
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view of what the state claimed, they were valueless. Had the 
defendant been permitted to take depositions as this court 
has held he was entitled to do, he would have tied this matter 
down to details which he could have checked before trial and 
could have determined the credibility of these particular 
witnesses, both from the standpoint of their interest in the 
case and the accuracy of their recollection of what had occurred. 
The denial of this right, of which this court acknowledges 
the defendant has been deprived, has deprived the defendant 
of his right of a fair trial and to due process of law in violation 
of Section 7, Article I of the Constitution of the State of Utah 
and the 14th Amendment of the Constitution of the United 
States. 
POINT VI 
THE COURT ERRED IN HOLDING THAT THERE 
WAS A COMMON LAW CRIME KNOWN AS ((MAL-
FEASANCE IN OFFICE" WHICH SHOULD HAVE AD-
VISED PERSONS OF ORDINARY INTELLIGENCE OF 
THE MEANING OF SUCH TERM. 
The court states in its opinion ((malfeasance is a crime 
recognized at common law." With this statement counsel 
for the defense takes issue. Reference is made to our brief, 
pages 19, 20 and 21. At common law as at present the term 
malfeasance is a generic term describing a group of offenses. 
It is not an offense in and of itself. It is just as general a 
term as the word ((tort,, which covers a multitude of civil 
wrongs under the common law. It is not a term of any exact 
or definite meaning. We agree that the framers of our 
constitution quite properly made public officers removable 
10 
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from office for malfeasance in office. This, however, is not 
a self-executing provision, but is a provision which requires 
legislative implementation. The legislative implementation 
under a general constituional term covering a broad scope 
should not be mere! y in the language of the constitution, but 
should be a definite and precise description of the acts pro-
hibited. It is our contention that failure of the legislature 
to so do has made the statute in question vulnerable under 
the 14th Amendment to the Constitution of the United States 
and Article I, Section 7 of the Constitution of the State of Utah. 
POINT VII 
THE COURT ERRONEOUSLY HELD THAT THE 
THREE CHARGES IN THE ACCUSATION IN THIS CASE 
WERE SUCH CHARGES AS COULD BE CHARGED IN A 
SINGLE INDICTMENT AND TRIED IN A SINGLE TRIAL 
UNDER THE RULES OF CRIMINAL PROCEDURE OF 
THE LAWS OF THE STATE OF UTAH. 
At the risk of again being censored by the court for being 
ctoverzealous," counsel for the defense again urges that the 
jury might well have been prejudiced against the defendant 
by the evidence submitted by the state in its abortive attempt 
to prove Count I. In answering this contention this court 
states in effect that under the criminal law Counts I, II and 
III could have been charged and tried together and that it 
would lead to an absurdity if the dismissal or a finding of 
not guilty as to one or more counts could be held to be 
prejudicial against the defendant on the remaining count of 
which he was found guilty. 
Counsel represents to the court that under the rules of 
11 
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criminal procedure of this state, Counts I, II and III could 
not have been charged together and could not have been tried 
together. Sec. 77-21-31, U.C.A. 1953, covers the matter of 
joinder of criminal offenses in a single information or indict-
ment. This section as amended by Chapter 170 of the Laws 
of Utah, 1957, provides that the information or indictment 
must charge but one offense. It holds that the same offense 
may be set forth in different forms under different counts or 
that different offenses may be charged together where they 
are related or connected together in their commission. Under 
this section the court has held that the following offenses 
may not be charged or tried together: Bigamy and adultery, 
U. S. v. West, 7 Ut. 437, 27 P. 84; rape and adultery, State 
v. Anderton, 69 Ut. 52, 252 Pac. 280. 
We do not have here a situation where one series of acts 
may give rise to two offenses and may thus be charged in two 
counts such as forgery and the making and passing of a forged 
instrument, or burglary and larceny. Here the offenses charged 
are separate, unrelated and distinct. If Count I were brought 
under the criminal law it would have to be brought under 
the bribery statute or under the conflict of interest statute. 
If Count II were brought under the criminal law, it would 
be larceny or embezzlement. If Count III were brought under 
the criminal law it would be aiding and abetting the prepa-
ration of a false or fictitious claim. Furthermore, there is no 
connection between the acts that occurred so far as the time 
or method of occurrence. They are separate, distinct and 
independent transactions. These acts could not have been 
joined or tried in a single indictment or information under 
the Rules of Criminal Procedure. 
12 
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We did not make a motion for severance because we 
did not feel we were proceeding under the code of criminal 
procedure, and other cases from this court involving removal 
indicate that several causes can be joined. However, we do 
maintain that recourse cannot be had to the criminal procedure 
as a basis for a holding that joinder was not prejudicial. This 
court itself points out that the facts involved in Count I are 
separate and distinct from the facts in Count II, and therefore, 
none of the evidence going to Count I could tend to prove 
the defendant guilty of Count II. However, this court can 
take judicial notice of the fact that the evidence under Count I 
was of such an inflammatory nature that it might make the 
jury much more ready to believe the defendant guilty of any 
other offense of any nature whatsoever. Under these circum-
stances it is our position that it was an abuse of discretion 
of the trial court to refuse a mistrial on the basis that the 
defendant was prejudiced by having the jury hear the evidence 
presented under Count I, notwithstanding the instruction of 
the court that they should disregard the same. We are sure 
the members of this court, as lawyers with extensive trial 
practice either as counsel or judge, must agree that one of 
the most futile gestures in our judicial procedure is the instruc-
tion to disregard evidence already heard. 
CONCLUSION 
The court has pointed out in its opinion that it may be 
possible for counsel to dissect an instruction and show that 
the individual parts thereof are faulty even though the in-
structions taken as a whole may properly inform the jury 
as to the elements of the offense, and as to their duty in regard 
13 
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thereto. Likewise, it is possible for this court to take each 
individual error in the case and say this alone would not have 
prejudiced the substantial rights of the defendant when all 
of the errors taken together may well have prevented the 
defendant from having a fair and impartial trial. 
This is not a case where the guilt of the defendant stands 
out clearly. It is a case balanced on a razor's edge where any 
error against the defendant may have been the thing that tipped 
the scale. It is further a case where the single straw may not 
have unduly ladened the camel, but the cumulative weight of 
all the straws may have broken its back. Without doubt the 
prosecutor and the court must be diligent in their efforts to 
assure proper handling of public affairs, but the danger to 
the public in this case, taken at its worst, v;eighs but little 
in the balance beside what this conviction has done to a member 
of this community and to his family. Any question as to 
whether or not a fair and impartial trial was had should be 
resolved in favor of a reversal of the court below. 
Counsel urges that the court reconsider this case, reset 
the same for oral argument if the court feels that such would 
contribute to a reconsideration, and upon such reconsideration 
with or without argument, reverse the decision of the court 
below. 
Respectfully submitted, 
CALVIN L. RAMPTON 
Attorney for Defendant and Appellant 
721 Confl Bank Bldg. 
Salt Lake City, Utah 
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